Tainted Morality: Systemic Oppression and Moral Responsibility

It is commonly believed that people who act autonomously are morally responsible for their actions. However, for those living under oppressive social conditions where their autonomy is challenged, whether from a lack of unforced options or a lack of moral epistemic background, the task of assigning moral responsibility for their actions is less obvious. On the one hand, it would be morally wrong to exempt people living under conditions of oppression from moral responsibility as this carries troubling consequences of stripping them of any claim to agency for their actions. On the other hand, it is difficult to assign appropriate blame when oppression interferes with autonomy. This essay explores moral frameworks and practices that consider how oppression can complicate and inform the standards for judging moral responsibility by answering the question: when autonomy is constrained by oppression, how should our practices of praise and blame adjust accordingly? I argue that while oppressive conditions may restrict agency, this does not eliminate moral responsibility for oppressed individuals, and I contend that analyzing oppressive contexts can offer valuable insight for improving our moral frameworks. I begin by constructing a theory of autonomy that preserves and sustains autonomy for individuals living under conditions of oppression. By demonstrating how autonomy is attainable for oppressed individuals, I then consider two theories that focus on the social aspect of moral responsibility and how we can adjust our moral practices according to one's social position.