A Challenge to the Moral Argument: The Problem of Animal Suffering

Within contemporary theology, the moral argument is one of the most frequently cited challenges to the naturalist. Andrew Ter Ern Loke offers a new formulation to the argument, framing divine nature as the necessary ontological standard for moral realism. This paper will offer an internal critique of his framework. Under the assumption of an objectively good God, a tension emerges given the pervasive nature of the problem of animal suffering. Suffering for the nonhuman animal is hardwired into the biological obligations of the natural world; under the assumption of a morally perfect personal creator, gratuitous predatory violence intuitively conflicts with our ethical expectations. The framework is then confronted with a dilemma: this deity either follows an entirely separate standard of ethic or directly violates the very nature that is meant to ground the objectivity. Available reconciliatory efforts for the problem are expansive, often utilizing the preexistent theodicies offered for humans such as arguments from free will and soul-making, with both missing the epistemic weight to extend the logic from human to nonhuman animal. This has led to a contemporary approach in neo-Cartesianism—the attribution of moral irrelevance to a lesser conscious status. Yet, the offered cases lack proportionate empirical grounding. Thus, as it stands, it appears a new explanation for the problem of animal suffering is needed to coherently posit the notion of theistic moral realism without an appeal to ignorance. This paper contends that until these tensions are resolved, the moral argument loses its persuasive force against the naturalist.