Stoic Compatibilism: Uncovering Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic World

This paper addresses a puzzle in Stoicism. While the school emphasizes virtue, control, and responsibility, it also maintains that all events are "fated" or "determined." This apparent incongruency in Stoicism has led to an ongoing scholarly debate about the tenability of Stoic compatibilism. In this paper, I insert myself into this debate. I do so by analyzing Stoic compatibilism through the lens of Frankfurtian compatibilism, asserting that even without the possibility to act otherwise, the Stoic understanding of freedom creates rational grounds for moral responsibility. I contend that even though the Stoics believe that our actions are causally determined, their understanding of rational assent allows actions to be attributable to agents. I suggest that this was the primary concern for the Stoics and that forcing contemporary understandings of free will upon ancient discussions of moral responsibility is an anachronistic retrojection that impairs our ability to understand ancient thought.